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I. INTRODUCTION
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"),
passed by Congress in 1967,1 made it illegal for an employer to
discriminate against an employee between the ages of forty and
sixty-five on the basis of age except "where age is a bona fide occu-
pational qualification ("BFOQ") reasonably necessary to the nor-
mal operation of the particular business or where the differentia-
tion is based on reasonable factors other than age."'2 The
prohibitions of the ADEA were made applicable to private employ-
ers, labor organizations, and employment agencies. The Act as
originally passed did not apply to the federal government, the
states or their political subdivisions, or employers with fewer than
twenty-five employees.5
The ADEA was amended in 1974 to cover federal, state, and
local governments,4 in 1978 to raise the minimum age for
mandatory retirement to seventy, 5 and then again in 1986 to pro-
hibit mandatory retirement for employees based on any chronolog-
ical age with an exception for public safety officers6 and tenured
college faculty.7 The exemption for public safety officers-the so-
' Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(1988)).
2 29 U.S.C. § 623 (f)(1)-(2) (1988).
See H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2213, 2223-24.
Fair Labor Standards Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, secs. 28(a)(2)-(3),
(b)(2) (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 630(b), 633a (1988)).
6 Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256,
sec. 12(a)-(b), 92 Stat. 189-190 (1978) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1988). The
April 6, 1978 legislation retained as a requirement for eligibility under the Act that an indi-
vidual be at least 40 years of age while raising the maximum age from 65 to 70. The legisla-
tion also added a subdivision (c) which permitted mandatory retirement of "bona fide exec-
utives or high policymakers." Id. Subdivision (c) provides:
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to prohibit compulsory retirement of any
employee who has attained 65 years of age . . .and who, for the 2-year period
immediately before retirement, is employed in a bona fide executive or a high
policymaking position, if such employee is entitled to an immediate nonforfeitable
annual retirement benefit from a pension, profit-sharing, savings, or deferred com-
pensation plan, or any combination of such plans, of the employer of such em-
ployee, which equals, in the aggregate, at least $27,000.
Id.
, Age Discrimination in Employment Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592, sec.
6(a), § 12, 100 Stat. 3342, 3344 (1986) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 631(j) (1988)).
' Id. sec. 3(a), § 4, 100 Stat. 342 (1986) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(j)
AGE DISCRIMINATION
called law enforcement exemption-was enacted after an extensive
debate in Congress over whether public safety would be endan-
gered by hiring or maintaining older police officers." Because the
debate proved inconclusive, the law enforcement exemption was
made temporary, to run from January 1, 1987 through December
31, 1993.9 It was assumed by Congress that the seven-year exemp-
tion would be sufficient time to allow the United States Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), the agency respon-
sible for administering the employment sections of the ADEA, to
conduct and complete a study on the impact on public safety of
the elimination of chronological age as a basis for either hiring or
retiring police officers.
The ADEA amendments of 1986, as part of the temporary law
enforcement exception, required the Secretary of Labor and the
EEOC, within four years of passage of the amendments, jointly to
complete a study "to determine whether physical and mental fit-
ness tests are valid measurements of the ability and competency of
police officers and firefighters to perform the requirements of their
jobs" and, if so, (1) "to determine which particular types of tests
most effectively measure such ability and competency," (2) "to de-
velop recommendations with respect to specific standards that
such tests, and the administration of such tests should satisfy" and
(3) to submit a report to Congress on their findings.' 0 The EEOC
(West Supp. 1990)).
I The 1986 ADEA Amendments which- took effect on January 1, 1987 exempted the
affected uniformed services from liability for those claims that arose after the effective date.
The uniformed services exemption, in pertinent part, reads as follows:
It shall not be unlawful for an employe which is a State, a political subdivision of
a State, an agency or instrumentality of a State or a political subdivision of a
State, or an interstate agency to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individ-
ual because of such individual's age if such action is taken
(1) with respect to the employment of an individual as a firefighter or as
a law enforcement officer and the individual has attained the age of hir-
ing or retirement in effect under applicable State or local law on March
3, 1983, and
(2) pursuant to a bona fide hiring or retirement plan that is not a sub-
terfuge to evade the purposes of this Act.
29 U.S.C.A. § 623(0) (West Supp. 1992). For the legislative history of the 1986 amendments
see H.R. REP. No. 756, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5628,
5628-42.
' Age Discrimination in Employment Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592, sec.
3(b) (1986). Section 3(b) of the 1986 amendments provides that "[tihe amendment made by
subsection (q) of this section [enacting the police and firefighter exemption, 29 U.S.C.A.
623(0) (West Supp. 1992)] is repealed by December 31, 1993." Id.
1o Id. sec. 5(a)(1),(2) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.A. § 622 (West Supp. 1992)).
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was also to propose testing guidelines by October 31, 1991 based on
its findings."
In fact, none of the mandates of the 1986 ADEA amendments
were met with respect to the four year time frame, the particular
tests and standards necessary to measure job performance, or the
EEOC testing guidelines to be proposed by October 31, 1991. The
EEOC did, however, ask Penn State University's Center for Ap-
plied Behavioral Sciences to conduct such a study, which was com-
pleted in January 1992. The study recommended that the exemp-
tion of public safety officers from the provisions of the 1986
amendments be eliminated and that law enforcement positions be
treated like all others covered by the ADEA. The study concluded
that age is not an accurate predictor of either job performance or
ability to perform; deficits in either of these that present a grave
danger to public safety were only marginally associated with
chronological age and much better predicted by available tests not
based on age.12
The Penn State study, however, failed to put forth a definitive
test for hiring or maintaining police officers that satisfied the man-
date of the 1986 amendments or was job-related and thus able to
withstand legal attack any better than the age standard. Although
the study and its proponents maintained that there were better
tests for law enforcement jobs than age, they presented no availa-
ble test which, if challenged, would be upheld with certainty as
sufficiently job and task related as a measure of an individual's fit-
ness for a police job. In fact, in the absence of a court-approved
test there is not even a legal consensus as to what constitutes the
precise tasks that a police officer must perform and whether, once
determined, such tasks must be measured by frequency, criticality,
or some other measure. The EEOC's failure to propose testing
guidelines was, thus, to be expected.
The absence of such a job task analysis and of a standard for
" Id. at secs. 5(a),(c), 100 Stat. 3342, 3343 (1986). The ADEA's enforcement provisions
are contained in 29 U.S.C. § 626, and the Act was originally enforced by the Secretary of
Labor. In 1978, President Carter's Reorganization Plan transferred enforcement of the Act
to EEOC, and enforcement of the ADEA remains vested with EEOC today. See 3 C.F.R. §
321 (1978).
12 See CENTER FOR APPLIED BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES, PENN. STATE UNIVERSITY, ALTERNA-
TIVES To CHRONOLOGICAL AGE IN DETERMINING STANDARDS OF SUITABILITY FOR PUBLIC
SAFETY JOBS: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF MEDICAL SECTION 8-18 (1992); see also Cheryl Anthony
Epps, Legislative Alert: Penn State Study Recommends Elimination of ADEA Public
Safety Exception, POLICE CHIEF, May 1992, at 14 (detailed analysis of study).
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measuring job performance has been brought into sharp focus by
the passage in 1990 of the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA"), which was directed at discrimination against the dis-
abled in employment and public accommodations. 13 Under the
ADA, municipalities can no longer automatically disqualify appli-
cants for police employment because of a medical condition. Each
police candidate has to be given an "individualized assessment" to
determine whether or not he can do the tasks of a police officer
irrespective of his medical condition. 14 Such an individualized as-
sessment, however, cannot be performed without a legal consensus
as to what police tasks are. Thus, in practice, police departments
are currently unable to disqualify anyone who is determined to be-
come a police officer, who qualifies as disabled under the ADA,'
5
and who is willing to challenge his disqualification in the courts
based on the absence of a job task analysis and of a standard for
measuring job performance. The removal of the age standard
under the ADEA, therefore, would create sole reliance on an indi-
vidualized assessment standard for police employment and reten-
tion that cannot efficiently and reliably be applied at this time. It
is estimated that a job task analysis for police officers is still years
away from completion"6 since this objective was not accomplished
by the EEOC and the Secretary of Labor as mandated by the 1986
ADEA amendments.
If the law enforcement exemption expires without renewal,
municipalities contend that they will have major difficulties in
complying with the ADEA's anti-discrimination provisions while
13 Pub. L. No. 101-336, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. (104 Stat.) 327 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 706 &
42 U.S.C. 12,102, 12,112).
" The legislative history of the ADA makes clear that each qualified individual with a
disability must be treated with an individualized approach that does not result in segrega-
tion of the disabled and is free of stereotyping and generalizations. See S. REP. No. 116,
101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 28 (1990); H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., note 1, pt.
2 at 76, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 454.
" "Disability" is defined in section 3 of the Act to mean "with respect to an individ-
ual-(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major
life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such impairment; or (C) being regarded as
having such impairment." 42 U.S.C.A. § 12,102(2) (West Pamph. 1992).
11 Interview with Deborah L. Zoland, Managing Attorney, Legal Bureau, New York
City Police Department in New York, N.Y. (Sept. 15, 1992); Interview with Lt. Chris Sulli-
van, Research Analyst, Personnel Bureau, New York City Police Department, in New York,
N.Y. (Sept. 16, 1992). Both Ms. Zoland and Lt. Sullivan are officials of the New York City
Police Department who are charged with the responsibility for implementing the ADA and
their individualized assessment has provided this estimate for completion of the job task
analysis.
19931
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
seeking to employ and retain only those who can properly perform
their public safety tasks. The absence of definitive, validated per-
formance tests and a job task analysis for police officers means
that each individualized assessment of a police-officer for retire-
ment or a police candidate for hiring is a potential source of litiga-
tion. Unless police departments can obtain an extension of the law
enforcement exemption, they will have to make a renewed effort to
establish that age is a BFOQ reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of the law enforcement business.
In the light of these problems, this Article will first examine
the antecedents of the law enforcement exemption. Next it will
present and analyze the case law on age limits for public safety
personnel and the BFOQ, culminating in a review of the United
States Supreme Court rulings on the ADEA and public safety and
an assessment of the prospects for a law enforcement BFOQ to the
ADEA. Finally, this Article will examine the interplay between the
ADA and the ADEA and the public debate over a law enforcement
exemption and its prospects for extension, and conclude by analyz-
ing the implications that may be inferred regarding the impact of
the ADEA on state and local law enforcement activities.
II. THE ANTECEDENTS OF THE LAW ENFORCEMENT EXEMPTION
The concept of early retirement for law enforcement personnel
was first implemented through an amendment to the Civil Service
Retirement Act of 1930,17 passed by Congress in 1947, which al-
lowed voluntary early retirement at age fifty, after at least twenty
years of service, for Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") per-
sonnel whom the Attorney General identified as no longer able to
perform efficiently.' The rationale for the early retirement was
that it was an appropriate reward to those who had performed ar-
duous and hazardous work. 19 Presumably, the early retirement in-
ducement sought to avoid possible "burnout" of these FBI person-
nel and the dangers posed to themselves and to the public if they
persisted on the job while their physical abilities declined. Signifi-
"' Act of July 11, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-168, 61 Stat. 307 (1947) (amending Civil Service
Retirement Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-279, 46 Stat. 468 (1930)).
IS Id.
'9 See S. REP. No. 76, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1947), reprinted in 1947 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1277, 1278; THE MYTHS AND REALITIES OF AGE LIMITS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
FIREFIGHTING PERSONNEL, A REPORT BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON AGING,
H.R. Doc. No. 468, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1984) [hereinafter MYTHS AND REALITIES].
[Vol. 67:13
AGE DISCRIMINATION
cantly, the 1947 law allowed early retirement as an option rather
than mandating it. In addition, the initial pension costs to the fed-
eral government were minimal as "only 36 agents would be eligible
to retire at the time the law was passed and only 64 agents would
become eligible during the following 5 years."20
However, other employee groups whose personnel performed
work similar to FBI personnel began demanding equal retirement
benefits shortly after enactment of the early retirement provision.
As a result of this pressure, Congress, in 1948, extended these ben-
efits to all federal employees with duties involving investigation,
apprehension, and detention of individuals suspected or convicted
of committing federal crimes.2 Other extensions followed as cover-
age came to include certain federal correctional employees in
195622 and federal air traffic controllers2" and firefighters in 1972.24
Congress also extended coverage to employees in these occupations
who subsequently transferred to supervisory or administrative
positions. 5
It is noteworthy that when the ADEA was passed in 1967
there was no consideration given to creating a law enforcement ex-
emption and mandating the voluntary early retirement previously
made available to these federal employees. Clearly, as long as early
retirement programs were optional on the part of the federal em-
ployee in question, there could be no conflict with the ADEA when
that act was passed in 1967. In 1974, however, Congress estab-
lished a mandatory retirement system for federal law enforcement
officers and firefighters, effective January 1, 1978, that required au-
tomatic retirement at age fifty-five or after twenty years of service,
whichever came later.26 The 1974 Act, in effect, exempted federal
law enforcement officers and firefighters from ADEA coverage. All
references to employee hazards-the original rationale for the op-
20 MYTHS AND REALITIES, supra note 19, at 1.
" See Act of July 2, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-879, ch. 807, 62 Stat. 1221 (1948) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 8331 (1988)).
22 Civil Service Retirement Act Amendments of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-854, sec. 401 §
6(c), 70 Stat. 743 (1956) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 8331 (1988)).
23 Act of May 16, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-297, sec. 3, § 3381, 86 Stat. 142 (1972) (codified
as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 4101, 5701 (1988)).
2 Act of Aug. 14, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-382, sec. 411, § 8336(c), 86 Stat. 539 (1972)
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 8336(c) (1988)).
22 See 5 U.S.C.A. § 8336(h) (West Pamph. 1992).
20 Act of July 12, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-350, sec. 4, § 8335, 88 Stat. 356 (1974) (codified
as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 8335(b) (1988)). The mandatory retirement age could be raised to
age 60 at the discretion of the agency head if the public interest so required. Id.
1993]
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tional retirement benefit offered to certain FBI personnel in
1947-were deleted by the 1974 legislation.17 Benefits were liberal-
ized for these mandated retirees, and the legislative history em-
phasized that the liberalized benefits would improve the quality of
law enforcement and firefighting services by helping to maintain a
young and vigorous work force."8 The assumption that the quality
and vigor of law enforcement were directly related to age and
youth was totally contrary to the assumptions underlying passage
of the ADEA in 1967 and its subsequent amendments.
Under the 1974 Act many occupational groups became eligible
for mandatory retirement, and when the law became effective in
1978 about 52,000 employees in various federal agencies and the
District of Columbia government were covered. 29 Therefore, the
optional retirement program first legislated by Congress in 1947 to
benefit a mere 36 FBI agents subject to hazardous duty had, by
1978, evolved into a mandatory retirement program and age-based
hiring system covering 52,000 employees. The assumptions under-
lying the maximum age rules for hiring and retention of employees
for federal law enforcement and firefighting positions became the
basis for arguments in favor of a law enforcement exemption for
state and local law enforcement and firefighting personnel when
these positions were made subject to the ADEA in 1974.30 Al-
though the ADEA had been amended in 1974 to extend to federal,
state, and local governments, in practice the mandatory retirement
program for federal law enforcement and firefighting personnel,
also passed in 1974, restricted the ADEA's application to state and
local law enforcement and firefighting personnel. Consequently,
there is a glaring inconsistency in Congress's recognition of the
need for federal law enforcement officers to be young and vigorous
2" See Act of July 12, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-350, sec. 5, § 8336(c), 88 Stat. 356 (1974); S.
REP. No. 948, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3698, 3698
(amendment removes requirement that Civil Service Commission evaluate hazards associ-
ated with employment position).
28 See S. REP. No. 948, supra note 27, at 2, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3699;
MYTHS AND REALITIES, supra note 19, at 2.
29 MYTHS AND REALITIES, supra note 19, at 2. The legislation also permitted any agency
head with employees covered by the prior special early retirement statute of 1947 to set
minimum and maximum hiring ages for covered employees. Act of July 12, 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-350, sec. 1(2), § (d), 88 Stat. 355 (1974).
30 Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, sec. 28(g)(2), §
11(b)(2), 88 Stat. 55, 78 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 630(b)(2) (1988)) Con-
gress extended the definition of "employer" under Section 11(b) of the ADEA to include
state and local governments. Id.
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while simultaneously imposing on state and local governments the
ADEA's requirements that may prevent these entities from main-
taining their own young and vigorous police force. Although there
is an absence of logic in justifying an exemption based solely on
whether a law enforcement officer or firefighter is classified as fed-
eral as opposed to state or local, that is the current state of the
law.
III. CASE LAW ON AGE LIMITS FOR PUBLIC SAFETY PERSONNEL
AND THE BONA FIDE OCCUPATIONAL QUALIFICATION
A. The Two-Prong Test for Establishing a BFOQ
To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under the
ADEA, it is sufficient for the plaintiff to show that an employer
utilizes a mandatory retirement policy or an age-based hiring pol-
icy, that he is forty or older, that he was denied employment on
the basis of age, and that he otherwise met the job qualifications.31
In virtually all cases dealing with challenges to mandatory age re-
quirements for jobs involving public safety, the defendant em-
ployer asserts as an affirmative defense that the age limitation is a
BFOQ.
The BFOQ defense acknowledges that age is a determining
factor in the challenged employment decision but asserts that the
use of age is "reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the
particular business." 2 A two-prong test for employers involved in
public safety to establish a BFOQ was fashioned by the Fifth Cir-
cuit in Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc.33 Under the first prong
of this test, a safety factor is considered in determining if a partic-
ular job qualification is "reasonably necessary to the essence of [a]
business. ' ' 34 The court noted that "[the] greater the safety factor,
measured by the likelihood of harm and the probable severity of
3, See, e.g., EEOC v. Missouri Highway Patrol, 555 F. Supp. 97, 104 (W.D. Mo. 1982),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 748 F.2d 447 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 828 (1985);
EEOC v. City of Minneapolis, 537 F. Supp. 750, 756 (D. Minn. 1982). The guidelines for
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADEA were originally set forth
in the context of racial discrimination under Title VII in McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 802 (1973). See Cova v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 574 F.2d 958, 959 (8th Cir. 1978)
(adopting Title VII discrimination guidelines for ADEA).
32 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1988) (defining BFOQ).
33 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976).
3 Id. at 236.
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that harm in the case of an accident, the more stringent may be
the job qualification designed to ensure [safety] . ' '3 The second
prong requires that an employer show either that it has reasonable
cause, i.e., a factual basis, for believing that all or substantially all
of the older employees possess traits precluding safe and efficient
job performance or that it would be impractical or impossible to
test reliably, on an individual basis, an employee's ability to per-
form safely and adequately the duties of his position. 6
In Tamiami, a case involving intercity bus drivers, the Fifth
Circuit concluded that the mere presence of a public safety factor
did not require courts to drop or modify both components of its
two-prong BFOQ test. However, since the case involved the safety
of large numbers of people on a continual basis, the court ruled
against the Secretary of Labor and upheld the age forty hiring
limit as a BFOQ.3 7
The Tamiami two-pronged formulation of the employer's bur-
den for a BFOQ is in accord with the approach taken by virtually
every other circuit that has addressed the BFOQ defense38 and was
adopted by the EEOC in its regulations.3 Section 1625.6(b) of
these regulations provides:
[A]nyone asserting a BFOQ defense has the burden of proving
that (1) the age limit is reasonably necessary to the essence of the
business, and either (2) that all or substantially all individuals
excluded from the job involved are in fact disqualified, or (3) that
some of the individuals so excluded possess a disqualifying trait
35 Id.
36 Id. The requirement that the age restriction be reasonably necessary to the essence
of the business has generally not been treated as an independent requirement in cases in-
volving employers such as law enforcement agencies. In practice, the courts have usually
considered only whether such employers have met one of the two alternative requirements
comprising the second prong of the Tamiami test. See EEOC v. County of Los Angeles, 706
F.2d 1039, 1042-43 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 1073 (1984); Missouri Highway
Patrol, 555 F.Supp. at 104; see also 29 C.F.R. 1625.6 (1992).
11 Tamiami, 531 F.2d at 238. The test in Tamiami was fashioned by the Fifth Circuit
by using the criteria employed in Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971), and Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel., 408
F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969), two sex discrimination cases, and adapting them for the purposes
of age ADEA.
38 See, e.g., EEOC v. City of St. Paul, 671 F.2d 1162, 1166 (8th Cir. 1982); Orzel v. City
of Wauwatosa Fire Dept., 697 F.2d 743, 747 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 992 (1983);
Tuohy v. Ford Motor Co., 675 F.2d 842, 844-45 (6th Cir. 1982); Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d
1267, 1271 (4th Cir. 1977).
" See 29 C.F.R. § 1625.6 (1992)
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that cannot be ascertained except by reference to age.40
The EEOC regulation goes on to state that "[i]f the employer's
objective in asserting a BFOQ is the goal of public safety, the em-
ployer must prove that the challenged practice does indeed effectu-
ate that goal and that there is no acceptable alternative which
would better advance or equally advance it with less discrimina-
tory impact."41
B. Case Law on Age Limits for Law Enforcement Personnel
A review of subsequent cases shows that the BFOQ provision
has been narrowly construed and may be invoked only if an em-
ployer proves clearly and unmistakably that its employment prac-
tice meets the terms and spirit of the ADEA.42 Thus, in EEOC v.
Missouri State Highway Patrol,4 a case involving maximum hiring
age,44 the United States District Court for Western Missouri deter-
mined that the Missouri State Highway Patrol had proven that its
maximum hiring age of thirty-two was a BFOQ for troopers. The
court reasoned that, upon being hired, the troopers spend almost
all of their time in the field doing strenuous physical work which
requires youth and vigor. When the troopers get older and achieve
higher ranks, they spend almost all of their time doing administra-
tive work. The court found a natural progression from field work to
office work, as the troopers aged and youth and vigor diminished.
The experience acquired in the field made a veteran patrolman an
excellent administrator. Since it took about eleven years for a
trooper to gain sufficient experience to become an effective admin-
istrator, the court reasoned, a maximum hiring age was necessary
40 Id.
41 Id.
41 See Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 713 F.2d 940, 951 (2d Cir.
1983), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub. nom Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111
(1984).
43 555 F. Supp. 97, 104 (W.D. Mo. 1982), afl'd in part, rev'd in part, 748 F.2d 447 (8th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 828 (1985).
41 Id. at 98. The court also found that the defendant's mandatory retirement age of 60
for uniformed members of the Patrol and the defendant's maximum hiring age of 32 for
radio operators both violated the ADEA. Id. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed the
holding. EEOC v. Missouri State Highway Patrol, 748 F.2d 447 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 828 (1985). The Eighth Circuit reasoned that public safety and lives depended on
the capabilities of Patrol members and radio operators, and found the age requirements
justified for this reason. Id. at 455, 457. Even though the Supreme Court denied certiorari,
the reasoning of the Eighth Circuit has been completely rejected in similar cases. See infra
notes 59-72 and accompanying text.
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to insure vigorous patrolmen in the field and experienced adminis-
trators in the office.1
5
Likewise, in Beck v. Borough of Manheim,46 a former police
officer sued the Pennsylvania borough of Manheim under the
ADEA challenging an ordinance that forcibly retired him at the
age of sixty. The district court upheld the ordinance as reasonably
necessary to ensure that police officers were in adequate physical
condition to protect the safety and welfare of citizens and prop-
erty. The court noted that the physical condition of police in that
case was particularly important "both because of difficulty in ar-
ranging substitute coverage and because small size of force made
backup help to an officer responding to an emergency situation
often unavailable.' 147 Thus, there could be serious consequences to
fellow officers if a police officer were unable to perform.48
Along with the above mentioned district court cases, there are
a handful of federal circuit court cases in which the law enforce-
ment employer's BFOQ was upheld to rebut an age discrimination
charge under the ADEA. In Mahoney v. Trabucco,49 a state police
officer was mandatorily retired upon reaching the age of fifty. He
sued in district court under the ADEA and won. 50 On appeal, how-
ever, the First Circuit held that a BFOQ exception to the ADEA
"was to be analyzed in terms of recognized and discrete vocations
rather than by" a particularized inquiry into an individual's spe-
cific duties and that, therefore, the state's BFOQ was justifiable
even though the officer in question had nonstrenuous duties.5
Thus, the First Circuit reversed the district court, reasoning that
an interpretation of a BFOQ "which permits a particularistic anal-
ysis of the actual duties performed to overcome an otherwise justi-
fied BFOQ for similarly classified employees, would raise immea-
surable problems of morale, administration, litigation, and
adjudication. '52
Similarly, in EEOC v. University of Texas Health Science
Center,53 the EEOC challenged the University's refusal to hire
4' Id. at 456-57.
46 505 F. Supp. 923 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
'7 td. at 926.
48 Id. at 926-27.
" 738 F.2d 35 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984).
'o Mahoney v. Trabucco, 574 F. Supp. 955 (D. Mass. 1983).
" Mahoney, 738 F.2d at 39.
52 Id.
53 710 F.2d 1091 (5th Cir. 1983).
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campus police officers who were over the age of forty-five. The
Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision upholding the
BFOQ rebuttal to the age discrimination charge, finding that there
was convincing testimonial evidence by a doctor about the deterio-
ration of age, sufficient to support the two prongs of the Tamiami
test. 4 The court also set great store in the University's efforts at
fact-finding to support its position and concluded that since the
trial court's findings were not clearly erroneous they must be
upheld. , '
Another circuit court decision in the law enforcement field up-
holding a BFOQ defense was EEOC v. City of Janesville.6 In that
case the Seventh Circuit upheld a mandatory retirement age of
fifty-five for all employees in protective service occupations as ap-
plied against a police chief. Deferring to the Wisconsin legislature,
much as the Fifth Circuit had deferred to the University of Texas,
the court noted with approval the legislature's judgment that "be-
ing younger than age 55 is a BFOQ for the generic class of protec-
tive service occupations. ' 57 The Seventh Circuit went on to reverse
an order that had granted a preliminary injunction, holding that
public safety is a legitimate state concern and sufficient justifica-
tion for a BFOQ, and that the plaintiff was not likely to succeed at
trial.58
This handful of circuit court and district court cases are the
rare and isolated victories for law enforcement agencies seeking the
BFOQ exception to the application of the ADEA. For the most
part, and especially in more recent cases, the BFOQ argument has
not been upheld. The Eighth Circuit, for example, disagreed with
the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Janesville when confronted with
similar facts concerning the city's fire chief in EEOC v. City of St.
Paul."9 The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's considera-
tion of different subclasses of firefighting personnel and its finding
that age was not a BFOQ for the city's fire chief position.6 0 The
court stated that the plain meaning of the phrase "bona fide occu-
pational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation
" Id. at 1095.
0' Id. at 1094.
58 630 F.2d 1254 (7th Cir. 1980).
'7 Id. at 1258.
58 Id. at 1259.
" 671 F.2d 1162 (8th Cir. 1982).
'0 Id. at 1166-68. The district court did find that the mandatory retirement age of 65
was a valid BFOQ for firefighters, fire equipment operators and fire captains. Id. at 1167.
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of the particular business" did not preclude consideration of a par-
ticular occupation within a particular business.61
The St. Paul court also examined the legislative history of the
ADEA, finding that Congress intended employment decisions to be
based on ability as opposed to age. The court decided that the
ADEA's goal would be frustrated if employment decisions were
based on a generic class as a whole rather than on separate consid-
eration of the different occupations within a business.s2 It would
not be difficult to determine these occupations, the Eighth Circuit
found, because a court would merely have to look at the parties
before it. In a statement that has often been cited by federal courts
striking down BFOQ defenses by law enforcement agencies, the
Eighth Circuit concluded, "we cannot believe that the ADEA was
intended to allow a city to retire a police dispatcher because that
person is too old to serve on a SWAT team. '6 3
The Third Circuit has decided a number of cases which illus-
trate the extreme weakness of the BFOQ argument made by law
enforcement agencies in defense against an ADEA charge. In
EEOC v. County of Allegheny, 4 the Third Circuit held that the
county could not rely on a state statute as a basis for refusing to
allow individuals over the age of thirty-five to take the police of-
ficer examination. The court concluded that the ADEA superseded
the state statute and that the county had failed to satisfy either of
the two prongs of the Tamiami test required to establish a BFOQ.
Under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, the court noted,
a state statute which conflicts with a federal statute cannot
stand.6 5
In EEOC v. City of Altoona,66 the Third Circuit held that the
Tenth Amendment did not prohibit Congress from applying the
61 Id. at 1165.
62 Id. at 1165-66.
63 Id. at 1166.
64 705 F.2d 679 (3d Cir. 1983).
65 Id. at 682. In EEOC v. Pennsylvania State Police, 768 F.2d 514 (3d Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 935 (1988), the Third Circuit vacated and remanded a district court deci-
sion which had improperly assumed that good health and physical strength were BFOQs
reasonably necessary to the essence of state police business without first making a particu-
larized factual finding to that effect. Id. at 518. The case involved a challenge to a Pennsyl-
vania law that required all state police officers to retire at age 60. Id. at 516; see also EEOC
v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, 565 F. Supp. 520 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (finding state
agency's mandatory retirement policy of 65 for enforcement officers violated ADEA because
agency failed to establish BFOQ required by Tamiami).
66 723 F.2d 4 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 935 (1988).
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ADEA to municipalities and that the city's mandatory retirement
of employees based on age violated the ADEA. In that case, those
sixty-five or over who were pension eligible were singled out for
mandatory retirement. However, the court concluded, economic
considerations such as pension eligibility could not be used to jus-
tify age discrimination." The court found Allegheny controlling as
precedent and refused to allow the BFOQ defense.6
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit, in Arritt v. Grisell,6 9 considered
the rejection, solely on grounds of age, of a forty-year-old applicant
for a police position. The West Virginia municipality of Mounds-
ville had a statutory upper age limit of thirty-five for new hires.
The district court held for the municipality on the ground that age
was not a suspect classification such as race and ethnicity under
Title VII and so required no strict scrutiny.70 Thus, the district
court had held that the municipality merely had to establish a
minimal increase in harm to its police function by having to hire
those over thirty-five in order for the age restriction to be upheld
as reasonable. The justification that the age restriction was condu-
cive to providing a police force comprised of physically fit members
was accepted at face value.7 1
The Fourth Circuit reversed, pointing out that the lower court
had erred in requiring the municipality to demonstrate only a min-
imal increase in harm by employing the applicant and in not giving
him an opportunity to rebut the stated rationale for the BFOQ ar-
gument. The circuit court framed its analysis in terms of the two-
prong Tamiami test, which requires more than mere reasonable-
ness, while avoiding a Title VII analysis of suspect classifications
and fundamental rights.72
C. BFOQ for the Airline and Bus Industries: A Reduced
Standard
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Arritt is especially significant
for its rejection of the minimal standard established three years
earlier by the Seventh Circuit in Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines,
11 Id. at 7.
08 Id.
69 567 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1977).
70 421 F. Supp. 800, 804 (N.D. W. Va. 1976).
71 Id. at 803.
72 Arritt, 567 F.2d at 1271.
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Inc.,73 and cited by the district court in Arritt. In Hodgson, the
Seventh Circuit found in favor of the Greyhound company's age
thirty-five hiring limit for bus drivers. The court noted that, since
in intercity bus trips the economic and human risks'were great, the
burden of establishing a BFOQ for bus drivers was lighter than for
other occupations.74 The court then used a minimal standard of
reasonableness by requiring the employer to show only a rational
basis in fact for the employer's belief that increased age increased
the risk of harm.75 The court found sufficient rationale for the age
requirement in the fact that the human body undergoes physical
and sensory changes beginning at around age thirty-five and that
such degenerative changes have a detrimental impact on driving
skills.76
The Hodgson standard, allowing a BFOQ defense based on an
employer's mere belief in increased harm, has been upheld in pub-
lic safety cases involving bus drivers and airline personnel, but not
in cases involving law enforcement and firefighting personnel.
Thus, while Hodgson was similar to Tamiami in its facts and its
result, it effectively reduced the two-prong BFOQ test established
in Tamiami to a mere reasonableness test.
A district court in the Second Circuit also dealt with the issue
of a BFOQ for bus drivers in Maki v. Commissioner of Educa-
tion.77 In that case, the district court upheld a maximum age of
sixty-five for private school bus drivers as a BFOQ defense to an
ADEA complaint. The Maki court cited evidence that psychologi-
cal and physiological changes occur due to age that cannot be relia-
bly tested in school bus drivers after age sixty-five.78 Citing further
the overwhelming concern for the safety of transported school chil-
dren, the court concluded that it could not be said that the age
requirement was not reasonably necessary to the essence of the
business of school bus transportation.79 Rather than insisting on
the individual ability test required by the ADEA and Tamiami,
the Maki court fell back on a Hodgson standard of reasonableness
for bus drivers.80
"3 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975).
7 Id. at 865.
7, Id. at 863.
76 Id. at 865.
17 568 F. Supp. 252 (N.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 742 F.2d 1437 (2d Cir. 1984).
11 Id. at 256.




Cases involving the question of age and public safety in the
airline industry have generally followed the Hodgson line of rea-
soning even while ostensibly using the Tamiami two-prong test. In
Murnane v. American Airlines,81 for example, the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit allowed the use of the BFOQ defense to uphold the
airline's maximum hiring age of forty, stating, "the airline industry
must be accorded great leeway and discretion in determining the
manner in which it may be operated most safely. '82 The D.C. Cir-
cuit held further that the maximum age hiring rule for pilots was
justified since the best experience for flight captains was experi-
ence with the same airline in a lower-level flight job."3
In Johnson v. American Airlines,4 airline employees sued the
airline under the ADEA on its policy requiring flight officers to re-
tire or transfer to non-cockpit positions upon reaching age sixty.
The airline argued that its policy was a BFOQ since flight officer
positions were considered a training ground for pilot positions
which required retirement at age sixty. The Fifth Circuit affirmed
the district court and upheld the policy as a BFOQ by deferring to
the expertise of the airline industry in its judgment as to how best
to perform with the highest degree of safety.85 The Fifth Circuit
cited the two-prong Tamiami test but then essentially based its
decision on Murnane, stating, "courts simply do not possess the
expertise with which to supplant their judgment in the best man-
ner airlines can obtain that highest degree of safety for that of the
airlines."8 6
Similarly, in a federal age discrimination case, Starr v. Federal
Aviation Agency,s7 the Seventh Circuit rejected the arguments of
an airline pilot seeking an exemption from the federal agency's
"age 60 rule" mandating retirement for pilots at age sixty. The
court upheld the mandatory retirement on the basis of reasonable-
ness. 8 Noting the plaintiff's claims that he was very fit and in ex-
cellent health, the court pointed out that it did not matter how
immune he personally was to the impairments of age. As long as
the reasonableness test had been met, the court felt it proper to
81 667 F.2d 98 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982).
82 Id. at 101.
83 Id. at 99-100.
84 745 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1027 (1985).
85 Id.
"' Id. at 993.
589 F.2d 307 (7th Cir. 1978).
88 Id. at 314.
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defer to the judgment of the federal agency as presumably in-
tended by Congress. 9
The airline cases generally have followed a pattern of defer-
ring to the discretion of federal agencies that had existed prior to
the passage of the ADEA.90 By comparison, although the courts
deferred to the discretion of the airlines in Johnson and Murnane,
where no issue of federal regulation was involved, the public safety
question with respect to pilots has not been resolved in favor of the
employer nearly as consistently as in the bus cases. Thus, in
Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas,9' the Eighth-Circuit upheld an
age discrimination complaint by a test pilot. The court found that,
based on the facts, no BFOQ had been demonstrated by the com-
pany.9 2 The company had made only general assumptions about
the aging process and when a test pilot was too old to fly; these
assumptions were held to violate the ADEA.93
In Smallwood v. United Air Lines,9 the Fourth Circuit up-
held an age discrimination complaint brought by a forty-eight-
year-old airline pilot who was refused employment because he was
over the company's age limit for new hires of thirty-five. The court
found that the airline had failed to meet its burden of establishing
a BFOQ because it failed to satisfy either prong of the Tamiami
test.95 Moreover, addressing the airline's argument that hiring
older pilots would be economically burdensome, the court held
that economic considerations could not be the basis of a BFOQ,9 6
just as a cost-justification defense is not available in a Title VII
case.
9 7
Similarly, in Tuohy v. Ford Motor Company,98 the Sixth Cir-
cuit reversed a district court ruling of summary judgment in favor
of Ford Motor Company, which had terminated the plaintiff as a
pilot because he had reached the age of sixty. The Sixth Circuit
ruled that under the ADEA the district court could not simply
11 Id. at 313.
9o See Airline Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
366 U.S. 962 (1961).
91 553 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977).
92 Id. at 564.
93 Id. at 563-64.
9- 661 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1007 (1982).
9' Id. at 308.
96 Id. at 307.
17 See City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 , 717 (1978).
" 675 F.2d 842 (6th Cir. 1982).
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conclude, as it had, that age seemed a reasonable basis for retire-
ment and thus qualified as a BFOQ.9 9 The court held that a com-
pany policy does not qualify as a BFOQ simply because it seems
reasonable; it is required to be "reasonably necessary," a more dif-
ficult standard which is employed by the two-prong Tamiami
test.100
D. Firefighters and the BFOQ Defense
The difficulty faced by law enforcement employers in estab-
lishing a successful BFOQ rebuttal to an ADEA complaint has
been encountered by firefighter employers. In Orzel v. City of
Wauwatosa Fire Department,' a case concerning a firefighter
who had been promoted to the position of assistant fire chief, the
Seventh Circuit upheld the district court's ruling striking down the
city's mandatory retirement age of fifty-five for firefighters. The
Seventh Circuit specifically rejected the city's argument that its
age fifty-five limit was justified because of the Federal firefighters
mandatory retirement age.'02 The court stated that the federal
limit could not automatically be applied to "a wholly different
group of employees, operating under different working conditions,
and performing significantly different job functions."' 0 3 With re-
spect to the city's BFOQ claim, the court stated that, while public
safety might be a valid local goal, the ADEA still required a "par-
ticularized inquiry" into the facts concerning the age limitations in
accordance with the two-prong Tamiami test.10
4
The Orzel court distinguished Hodgson,10 5 with its reasonable-
ness standard, on the ground of demonstrated evidence regarding
the rigors of the bus driver's job, "the degenerative and hard-to-
detect physical and sensory changes which begin in a person's late
thirties and progress steadily thereafter," and the fact, docu-
mented statistically, "that Greyhound's safest driver is one who
has sixteen to twenty years of driving experience with Greyhound
and is between fifty and fifty-five years of age, an optimum blend
99 Id. at 845.
100 Id. at 843, 845-46.
101 697 F.2d 743 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 992 (1983).
102 Id. at 749, 760.
103 Id. at 749.
10 Id. at 753.
105 Hodgson, 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975); see also
supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text (discussing Hodgson).
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of age and experience with Greyhound which could never be at-
tained in hiring an applicant forty years of age or older."'1 6
Two district court cases concerning ADEA claims by firefight-
ers follow the same line of reasoning as Orzel. In Aaron v. Davis,
0 7
the district court held that the mandatory retirement, pursuant to
a local Arkansas ordinance, of an assistant fire chief and a district
fire chief at age sixty-two violated the ADEA. The Aaron court, in
rejecting the municipality's BFOQ defense, specifically distin-
guished the job of firefighter from that of an airline transport pilot
or bus driver: "The risk is far greater that a slight error in judg-
ment, or a slight physical defect, in a person who is piloting a jet-
liner or driving a bus would produce 'magnified' tragic results than
would in the case of one participating in a joint effort to extinguish
a fire."' 8 In another district court case, Popko v. City of Clair-
ton,109 decided in the same year as Orzel, it was found that age-
based retirement of firefighters pursuant to a state civil service
code nevertheless violated the ADEA. The district court compared
the plaintiff to a Title VII plaintiff and analyzed the case using
disparate treatment theory." 0
E. Current Status of the Law Enforcement BFOQ
Two Ninth Circuit cases are also significant in identifying the
parameters for the BFOQ in ADEA cases involving law enforce-
ment officers. In EEOC v. County of Los Angeles,"' the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that the county's maximum hiring age for helicopter pi-
lots in the sheriff's and fire departments was in violation of the
ADEA. The court found no BFOQ, reasoning that claims that
older persons would become unfit in a shorter period of time than
younger persons did not justify a maximum hiring age for "eco-
nomic considerations cannot be the basis for a BFOQ.""' 2 The
1o60rzel, 697 F.2d at 753 (citing Hodgson, 499 F.2d at 863).
107 414 F. Supp. 453 (E.D. Ark. 1976).
108 Id. at 462. The Orzel analysis with respect to firefighters was extended by the Sev-
enth Circuit to law enforcement officers in the case of Heiar v. Crawford County, 746 F.2d
1190 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1027 (1985). The court in that case upheld the
ADEA complaint of a deputy sheriff against the county on its mandatory retirement age of
55 for police officers, finding that the county could not establish the age of fifty-five as a
BFOQ. Id. at 1200.
... 570 F. Supp. 446 (W.D. Pa. 1983).
110 Id. at 451-53.
11 706 F.2d 1039 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073 (1984).
112 Id. at 1042, 1044.
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Ninth Circuit also pointedly noted that the federal statutory provi-
sions requiring mandatory retirement at age fifty-five for federal
law enforcement officers and firefighters"' in no way diminished
the ADEA's application to state and local governments since the
United States Supreme Court in EEOC v. Wyoming" 4 had consid-
ered that statute and then ignored it in its decision."15
In another Ninth Circuit case, EEOC v. County of Santa Bar-
bara,"' the court held that the county had not demonstrated a
BFOQ for its mandatory retirement system at age sixty for correc-
tion officers. The Ninth Circuit noted that the county had merely
asserted that the job involved safety considerations without put-
ting forth a factual foundation for its claim as required by the
ADEA.117 The court also made clear that in any conflict between
federal and state law, the ADEA must prevail under the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution." 8
With the above cases as background, two district court cases
are excellent indicators of the general thinking of the federal
courts on the matter of BFOQ's to the ADEA charges against law
enforcement employers. In Hahn v. City of Buffalo,"9 the court
held that a New York law limiting police candidates to twenty-
nine years of age or under violated the rights under the ADEA of
those applicants who were forty or older. The court found unper-
suasive a law enforcement expert's testimony about the deteriora-
tion of age and would not uphold a BFOQ on that basis. 120 Also
inadequate as a basis for a BFOQ was an employer's desire for a
youthful work force in order to maximize cost-effectiveness since
the state could not establish that age was otherwise a BFOQ.121
The court also noted with approval the Ninth Circuit's decision in
County of Los Angeles and its conclusion that "moment to mo-
ment physical vitality of a police officer" is not as urgent as in situ-
, 5 U.S.C. § 8335 (1988); see supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text (discussing
federal mandatory retirement).
114 460 U.S. 226 (1983).
"I County of Los Angeles, 706 F.2d at 1041-42; see also infra notes 125-39 and accom-
panying text (discussing Wyoming).
116 666 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1982).
'7 Id. at 376, 378.
, Id. it 378.
119 596 F. Supp. 939 (W.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 770 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1985).
"0 Id. at 954. Other expert testimony indicated that many officers in their forties were
as strong and physically fit as those in their twenties. Id. at 949-52.
"' Id. at 953.
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ations involving intercity bus drivers.'22
In EEOC v. City of Minneapolis,23 the EEOC sued the city on
its age sixty-five mandatory retirement for police captains, and the
district court held for the EEOC, finding no BFOQ. The court
noted that age was not a BFOQ for police captains since they did
not spend great amounts of time responding to field emergencies,
were not required to pass medical or physical fitness tests on a rou-
tine basis, and could not be reliably tested on their ability to han-
dle certain aspects of general police work.1
24
Where safety is the essence of a particular business such as
the transportation of passengers by bus or airplane, most courts
have held that the presence of such an overriding safety factor
minimizes the level of proof required to establish a BFOQ. Thus,
when the degree of risk to the public or fellow employees inherent
in the duties of a job is high, the fixing of a mandatory age may be
more arbitrary. These same courts, however, have not generally
considered the law enforcement and firefighting businesses to in-
volve a similar high risk or danger to public safety or fellow em-
ployees. It is necessary, therefore, to examine how the Supreme
Court has analyzed the ADEA in terms of public safety to deter-
mine whether this distinction drawn by the federal courts is cor-
rect and whether there are any prospects for a law enforcement
BFOQ to rebut an ADEA charge being upheld in the future.
IV. SUPREME COURT RULINGS ON PUBLIC SAFETY AND THE ADEA
The ADEA amendments of 1974 that made the Act applicable
to state and local governments, including state and local law en-
forcement and firefighting personnel, were litigated before the Su-
preme Court in EEOC v. Wyoming. 25 In Wyoming, the Court up-
held the ADEA's application to all employees of state and local
governments. In that case a supervisor for the Wyoming Game and
Fish Department was retired involuntarily at age fifty-five pursu-
122 Id. at 946 (quoting EEOC v. County of Los Angeles, 706 F.2d 1039, 1141 (9th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073 (1984)).
123 537 F. Supp. 750 (D. Minn. 1982).
.2 Id. at 756-58; see also Rodriguez v. Taylor, 428 F. Supp. 1118, 1121 (E.D. Pa. 1976)
(striking down age 41 hiring limit for security guard), vacated in part, 569 F.2d 1231 (3d
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978); EEOC v. Florida Dep't of Highway Safety and
Motor Vehicles, 660 F. Supp. 1104, 1110 (N.D. Fla. 1986) (striking down age 62 mandatory
retirement for state troopers); Adams v. James, 526 F. Supp. 80, 85 (M.D. Ala. 1981) (over-
turning age 61 mandatory retirement for state troopers).
125 460 U.S. 226 (1983).
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ant to Wyoming's mandatory retirement law. He complained to the
EEOC, alleging a violation of the ADEA, and the EEOC sued the
state of Wyoming on his behalf in federal district court. The dis-
trict court found for Wyoming, dismissing the suit on the ground
that insofar as the ADEA regulated Wyoming's employment rela-
tionship with its game wardens and other law enforcement officials,
it violated the doctrine of states rights,126 recently revived from
near obscurity by the Supreme Court in National League of Cities
v. Usery.27 The district court held, therefore, that the ADEA as
applied to the age restriction on Wyoming game wardens was
unconstitutional. 28
The Supreme Court, however, in a 5 to 4 decision, ruled that
the extension of the ADEA to cover state and local governments
was a valid exercise of Congress's powers under the Commerce
Clause, both on its face and as applied in the Wyoming case, and
was not precluded by virtue of constraints imposed upon such
powers by the Tenth Amendment. 29 The Court noted that Con-
gress's powers under the Commerce Clause were buttressed by its
power under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment. 130
The Court took note of the federal statute establishing a
mandatory age-based retirement system for federal law enforce-
ment officers and firefighters, and of other Congressional enact-
ments imposing mandatory retirement ages on certain classes of
federal employees. However, the Court nonetheless reversed on the
basis of Congress's powers, ignoring the federal mandatory retire-
ment systems in its decision.' 3 1
The Court stressed that the ADEA did not necessarily make
26 Id. at 234-35.
127 426 U.S. 833 (1976). In National League of Cities, the Supreme Court held that the
Tenth Amendment, which reserves unenumerated powers to the states, limits the power of
Congress to enact legislation involving "traditional governmental functions." Id. at 852. At
issue in the case was the power of Congress to establish minimum wage standards under the
Fair Labor Standards Act for state and local employees. Id. at 836-37. The Court eventually
overruled National League of Cities in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469
U.S. 528 (1985), holding that the "traditional governmental functions" test was not worka-
ble and in violation of the principles of federalism, thus allowing broader regulation of the
states by Congress. Id. at 537-47. See generally Vincent D. Palumbo, Note, National League
of Cities v. Usery to EEOC v. Wyoming: Evaluation of a Balancing Approach to Tenth
Amendment Analysis, 1984 DuKE L.J. 601 (1984) (providing in-depth discussion of Tenth
Amendment and applicable case law).
12s Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 235.
129 Id. at 243.
"Io Id. at 243 n.18.
121 Id. at 233, 240.
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all age limitations unlawful since an employer can use an age limi-
tation where he can prove that age is a BFOQ. 32 The BFOQ stan-
dard for a rebuttal to an ADEA complaint was interpreted strictly,
however, in a manner similar to the strict scrutiny standard ap-
plied in Title VII cases involving race, national origin, sex, or reli-
gious discrimination.1 33 The Court noted that in applying the
BFOQ standard to remove game wardens and other law enforce-
ment employees as unfit the ADEA "requires the State to achieve
its goals in a more individualized and careful manner than would
otherwise be the case, but it does not require the State to abandon
those goals. ' 1 3 4 The Court added that what the ADEA forbids is
arbitrary age distinctions based on stereotypical assumptions
rather than analysis or determinations based on individual
merit.131
The Wyoming Court also rejected the argument that the abo-
lition of age restrictions for law enforcement positions would be
financially burdensome for government. In refusing to consider
such an argument a valid BFOQ to an ADEA complaint, the Court
stated:
In this case, we cannot conclude from the nature of the ADEA
that it will have either a direct or an obvious negative effect on
state finances. Older workers with seniority may tend to get paid
more than younger workers without seniority and may by their
continued employment accrue increased benefits when they do re-
tire. But these increased costs, even if they were not largely spec-
ulative in their own right, might very well be outweighed by a
number of other factors: Those same older workers, as long as
they remain employed, will not have to be paid any pension bene-
fits at all, and will continue to contribute to the pension fund.
And, when they do retire, they will likely, as an actuarial matter,
receive benefits for fewer years than workers who retire early.136
While technically leaving the door open for a law enforcement
agency to establish a BFOQ that was empirically justified and indi-
132 Id.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 e-2(e) (1988). This section provides that "it shall not be an unlaw-
ful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees ... on the basis of
his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national
origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation
of that particular business or enterprise." Id.
'34 Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 239 (quoting FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 771 (1982)).
"I Id. at 241-42.
136 Id. at 241.
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vidualized for the employee or applicant in question, the Court, in
reality, made it virtually impossible to justify a BFOQ in support
of an age-based employment standard. Thus, in his dissent in Wy-
oming, Chief Justice Burger, discussing how difficult it was for the
employer to meet his burden in establishing a BFOQ, stated that
"[g]iven the state of modern medicine it is virtually impossible to
prove that all persons within a class are unable to perform a par-
ticular job or that it is impossible to test employees on an individ-
ual basis."'1 7
The Court in Wyoming, in effect, left state and local law en-
forcement agencies to the vagaries of a case-by-case BFOQ analy-
sis, but with little hope of success. The Wyoming case itself was
remanded to the district court to determine whether the state
could establish that its age limitation for game wardens was a
BFOQ in the light of the Supreme Court's decision.138 The district
court, surprisingly, held that Wyoming's statute for mandatory re-
tirement at age fifty-five for Game and Fish Department employ-
ees and members of the Highway Patrol was indeed a BFOQ. 3 9
Two other Supreme Court decisions, two years after Wyoming,
were even firmer in negating the practical effect of the BFOQ ex-
ception to the ADEA for law enforcement personnel and firefight-
ers. In Johnson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore,40 the
Court overturned the Fourth Circuit and restored a district court
decision that struck down retirement ages of fifty-five and sixty as
not constituting a BFOQ for firefighters under the Tamiami two-
prong test.'4 ' The Court, this time unanimously, held that the Fed-
eral civil service statute requiring federal firefighters to retire at
age fifty-five did not establish that retirement before age seventy
was a BFOQ for Baltimore's firefighters.142
The Fourth Circuit had based its ruling on a phrase in the
Supreme Court's Wyoming decision suggesting that state statutes
instituting a mandatory retirement age should be tested "against a
reasonable federal standard.' ' 43 Seizing upon this phrase, the
137 Id. at 258.
138 Id. at 244.
139 See EEOC v. State, No. C80-0336-B, 1983 WL 573, at *1 (D. Wyo. Aug. 19, 1983)
(denying defendant's motion for partial summary judgment on Eleventh Amendment
grounds after BFOQ determination was previously made by district court).
140 472 U.S. 353 (1985).
141 Id. at 360.
142 Id. at 361-62.
"I Id. at 361-62 (quoting Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 240).
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Fourth Circuit went on to cite the federal mandatory retirement
statute for federal law enforcement employees and firefighters as a
"reasonable federal standard," even though the Court in Wyoming
had already pointedly ignored this statute in applying the ADEA
to the Wyoming state government.14 4 The Fourth Circuit held that,
even absent a factual showing that firefighters over fifty-five could
not adequately perform their duties, the City of Baltimore had
made out a BFOQ for age under the ADEA as a matter of law
since its statute was similar to the federal one mandating retire-
ment based on age.145
The Supreme Court made clear that the Fourth Circuit had
misconstrued Wyoming and taken the phrase "reasonable federal
standard" out of context. In reversing the Fourth Circuit the Su-
preme Court held that a "reasonable federal standard," as de-
scribed in Wyoming, was the ADEA itself and not the federal
mandatory retirement statute. 4 6 The Court noted that in adopting
the federal mandatory retirement age for firefighters, Congress had
not acted out of considerations of safety or fitness. 147 The Court
concluded that "the history of the civil service provision ... makes
clear the decision to retire certain federal employees at an early
age was not based upon BFOQ's for the covered employment.1 48
Therefore, the Court reasoned that the Fourth Circuit had erred in
giving any weight to the federal firefighters statute and held that
the federal firefighters statute did not operate to validate Balti-
more's mandatory retirement statute under the ADEA.149
In Johnson, the Court also stated that stereotypical assump-
tions about the effects of aging on employee performance were in-
adequate to demonstrate a BFOQ. Instead the Court held that em-
ployers are required to make a "particularized factual showing"
that its age limitations meet the two-prong test set forth in
Tamiami. 50
On the same day as the Johnson case, the Supreme Court, in
Western Air Lines v. Criswell,'5' decided another ADEA case
along the same lines. Western Air Lines required its flight engi-
14 Id. at 363.
,45 Johnson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 731 F.2d 209, 212 (4th Cir. 1984).
14I Johnson, 472 U.S. at 361-62.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 363-64.
148 Id. at 371.
150 Id. at 362; see supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text (discussing Tamiami test).
... 472 U.S. 400 (1985).
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neers to retire at age sixty. A group of these flight engineers, forced
to retire at age sixty, sued the company for violation of the
ADEA.152 At trial in the district court, a jury found for the plain-
tiffs, rejecting the defendant's BFOQ defense, and the verdict was
affirmed first by the Ninth Circuit and then by the Supreme
Court.153 The Court held that the BFOQ exemption to the ADEA
was intended to be "an extremely narrow exception to the general
prohibition of age discrimination contained in the ADEA."'154 The
Court concluded that in order for an employer to demonstrate that
its age-based mandatory retirement rule was valid, it had to satisfy
the two-prong test set forth originally by the Fifth Circuit in
Tamiami and then adopted in the EEOC's regulations and by
other circuits. 5 Therefore, to establish that age is a BFOQ under
the ADEA, the Court held that an employer must first prove the
existence of a job qualification "reasonably necessary to the es-
sence of [its] business";156 it was insufficient to prove mere reason-
ableness. 5 Second, the employer must show that it has "reasona-
ble cause, that is, a factual basis, for believing that all or
substantially all persons [over the age qualifications] would be un-
able to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job in-
volved," or that it is "impossible or impractical" to accurately test
and predict the capabilities of individuals in the excluded group. 58
The Court duly noted the airline's argument that the Federal
Aviation Act requires that airlines operate with the "highest de-
gree of safety" and that because flight engineers (navigators) are
essential to flight safety, the airline should be permitted to termi-
nate flight engineers when they reach the age of sixty. 59 The air-
line claimed that after that age a flight engineer's performance be-
comes dangerously unpredictable. 60 In light of its paramount duty
to ensure passenger safety under the Federal Aviation Act, the air-
line maintained that a mandatory retirement rule prohibiting flight
152 Id. at 402-06.
"' Id. at 408.
Id. at 412 (quoting Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977)).
"' Id. at 413-16. The Court also recognized that Congress had implicitly endorsed the
two-prong Tamiami test in its 1978 amendments to the ADEA. Id. at 415.
'58 Id. at 413 (quoting Usery v. Tamiami Trial Tours, Inc., .531 F.2d 224, 236 (5th Cir.
1976)).
Id. at 414, 419 (quoting Tamiami, 531 F.2d at 235).
155 Id. at 414 (quoting Tamiami, 531 F.2d at 235) (alterations in original).
Id. at 420-21.
10 Id. at 414.
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engineers from flying after age sixty was necessary.161
In rejecting the airline's argument, the Court noted that the
language and the history of the ADEA supported the concept of an
individualized assessment of employee fitness.'62 While the Court
in Western Airlines recognized that the safe transportation of pas-
sengers is the primary purpose of an airline's business, it found
that recent advances in medical testing made it possible to have
individualized determinations of whether a particular flight engi-
neer can safely continue to perform his duties after age sixty. 6 3
Therefore, the Court concluded that the airline had failed to sat-
isfy the second prong of the Tamiami test because a broad age-
based retirement policy for flight engineers was not reasonably
necessary to ensure the safety of passengers and the public.'
Even in cases involving public safety, the Court determined, the
ADEA does not permit the trier of fact to give complete deference
to the employer's decision. 65
V. THE PROSPECTS FOR A LAW ENFORCEMENT BONA FIDE
OCCUPATIONAL QUALIFICATION REBUTTAL TO AN ADEA CHARGE
The prospects for a law enforcement BFOQ in view of these
Supreme Court decisions and the overwhelming body of case law in
the federal courts are not encouraging. While it is possible that a
court might find a law enforcement BFOQ, the law enforcement
community certainly cannot count on a BFOQ being upheld by
federal courts when the law enforcement exemption ends in 1993.
As the case law indicates, in order to determine whether a
challenged age limitation is a BFOQ, the relevant "occupation"
must first be defined by a "particularized inquiry.' 6 Courts have
been almost unanimous in concluding that the "occupation", not be
16! Id. at 418, 420.
162 Id. at 422. The preamble to the Act states that its purpose is "to promote the em-
ployment of older persons based on ability rather than age." Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act, § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1988).
163 Western Air Lines, 472 U.S. at 406.
16 Id. at 414.
16' Id. at 423. The Court stated that where experts can disagree as to one's ability at a
certain age, employers cannot be permitted to automatically resolve the issue in a conserva-
tive manner. Id.
166 Compare EEOC v. City of St. Paul, 671 F.2d 1162, 1165-66 (8th Cir. 1982) (employ-
ment decisions may not be based on generic classes) with Mahoney v. Trabucco, 738 F.2d
35, 42 (1st Cir. 1984) (BFOQ should be based on discrete vocations not particular individ-
ual's duties), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984).
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defined by a generic class of employees currently doing the job.
In cases dealing with law enforcement, the courts have also
demanded a rationale based on "reasonable necessity" to do the
job as part of the strict two-prong standard of review embodied in
Tamiami and the EEOC regulations. A defense based on mere
"reasonableness" is clearly insufficient, as is citation to the federal
retirement statute for federal law enforcement personnel and
firefighters. Additionally, contentions that state legislative deter-
minations regarding a mandatory retirement age are entitled to a
statutory presumption of correctness are given little weight.167
Generally, the courts have found a greater danger to public safety
in the employment of older pilots, flight engineers, and bus drivers
than older police officers and firefighters and have eased the appli-
cation of the two-prong test for airlines and bus companies, mak-
ing it easier for them to prove that age is a BFOQ.16 8
Specifically, the first prong of the BFOQ test is concerned
with the relationship between the underlying job qualifications and
the essence of the business. For a police department, the essence of
the business is the operation of an efficient police department for
the protection of the public, and the primary function of a police
officer is to "protect persons and property and to maintain law and
order." 119 Thus far, police departments have -been unable to meet
their burden of empirically satisfying either element of the second
prong of the Tamiami test for an age-based BFOQ. First, they
have been unable to prove that all or substantially all persons over
age forty could not perform the duties of a police officer safely and
effectively. Second, they have been unable to show that it is im-
practical or impossible to test reliably, on an individual basis, a
police officer's or applicant's ability to perform safely and ade-
quately the duties of the job.
The EEOC, in its regulations, has added a further requirement
to the Tamiami two-prong test, namely, that "the employer must
prove that the challenged practice does indeed effectuate [the] goal
[of public safety] and that there is no acceptable alternative which
could better advance it or equally advance it with less discrimina-
tory impact.'17 0 Although this last requirement is rarely mentioned
167 See EEOC v. City of Janesville, 630 F.2d 1254 (7th Cir. 1980).
"' See supra notes 73-100 and accompanying text (discussing BFOQ defense for pilots
and bus drivers).
169 Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267, 1272 (4th Cir. 1977).
170 29 C.F.R. § 1625.6 (1992).
1993]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
in the case law,'7 1 it increases a police department's burden under
the two-prong standard significantly.
The EEOC's additional regulatory requirement means that the
age restriction must be the least discriminatory means of promot-
ing the goal of public safety. If it is determined that individualized
testing could promote public safety as well as the mandatory age
requirement, then, under the regulation, the age restriction is ille-
gal even if the police department has shown that substantially all
of the older employees cannot perform adequately.
Therefore, any renewed effort to obtain a BFOQ must utilize
new approaches based on recent medical evidence on aging or new
testing procedures on the disabilities of age that obviate the need
for an individualized assessment. The new medical evidence or
testing procedures would have to show that all or nearly all indi-
viduals beyond a certain age share a common disqualifying trait
because of their age-rather than their age per se-that makes
them unfit for law enforcement work. Even such evidence would
not guarantee a BFOQ, however, since it could be argued that indi-
vidualized testing would promote public safety as effectively but in
a less discriminatory fashion. In the absence of such new ap-
proaches, nonetheless, a renewed effort to obtain a BFOQ would
appear fruitless. The body of case law in support of a BFOQ to
rebut an ADEA complaint is not only small in number but of mea-
ger precedential value as well.' 72 In the absence of a BFOQ, it re-
mains to analyze the interplay between the ADA and the ADEA
and to examine the public debate over a legislated law enforcement
exemption and the prospects of its extension.
' ' But see EEOC v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd., 565 F. Supp. 520, 523 (E.D. Pa.
1983).
172 See supra notes 42-58 and accompanying text. The 8th Circuit with cases such as
EEOC v. City of St. Paul, 671 F.2d 1162 (8th Cir. 1982), upholding the district court's find-
ing of BFOQ's for firefighters, fire equipment operators and fire captains, and EEOC v.
Missouri State Highway Patrol, 748 F.2d 447 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 828
(1985), were perhaps best for the uniformed services arguing for a BFOQ. However, they
were not controlling in subsequent cases and were superseded by the Supreme Court cases
discussed in the text. See supra notes 124-164 and accompanying text. Even, arguably, the
best case for proponents of a law enforcement BFOQ, Beck v. Borough of Manheim, 505 F.
Supp. 923 (E.D. Pa. 1981), is of limited precedential value because it relied heavily on the
fact that the small size of the Manheim police force (one chief and five officers) imposed
unusual burdens on the officers. These burdens included the unavailability of backup help
when responding to emergencies and the difficulty in arranging substitute coverage. Id. at
926. The Beck court apparently took these considerations into account in assessing the de-
mands of the job, thereby raising the physical standards against which the older officers'
performance was evaluated under the first prong of the Tamiami test. See id. at 925-26.
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VI. THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN THE ADA AND THE ADEA
The ADA, 173 which was signed into law on July 26, 1990 and
took effect in 1992, broadly extended the scope of the federal civil
rights protection against discrimination on the basis of disabil-
ity.17 4 It bans discrimination not only in the area of employment
but also in public transportation,'7 5 public accommodation, 76 and
telephone services and communications. 7
7
The legislative history of the ADA makes clear that each indi-
vidual with a disability otherwise qualified for employment must
be treated with an individualized approach that does not result in
separation of the disabled from the mainstream of employees or
applicants and is free of stereotyping and generalizations. 78 Thus,
the ADA parallels the ADEA in the requirement for employers
that they make employment decisions based on facts applicable to
individual applicants or employees and not on the basis of pre-
sumptions as to what a class of individuals can or cannot do. An
employer under the ADA may not make employment decisions by
stereotyping a class of individuals with disabilities, just as an em-
ployer under the ADEA may not make such decisions by stere-
otyping a class of older individuals. Under both the ADA and the
ADEA, it would be a violation to deny employment to an applicant
based upon generalized fears about the safety of the applicant or
about higher rates of absenteeism without demonstrating that the
individual poses the threat to be avoided.17 9
173 Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 706 and scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
174 Disabled Americans were first protected by the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which
applied to certain federally funded entities or activities. Pub. L. No, 93-112, § 503, 87 Stat.
355, 393 (1973) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1988). For example, § 503 covers federal
contractors or subcontractors having contracts in excess of $2,500., 29 U.S.C. § 793, while §
504 covers programs conducted by a federal executive agency or by the U.S. Postal Service,
and programs or agencies receiving federal financial assistance. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988).
'15 Americans with Disabilities Act, §§ 201-205, 221-222, 241-246, 304. 42 U.S.C.A. §§
12,131-34, 12,141-42, 12,161-65, 12,184 (West Pamp. 1992). The ADA's application to em-
ployers is found in §§ 101(2), (5) and 102(a). Id. § 12,111(2),(5), 12,112(a) (West Pamp.
1992).
-76 Id. §§ 301(2),(7), 302(a), 303(a). 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12,181(2),(7), 12,182(a), 12183(a)
(West Pamp. 1992).
17 Id. § 401.
178 See supra note 14. Section 102(b)(1) of the ADA specifies that the term "discrimi-
nate" includes "limiting, segregating, or classifying a job applicant or employee in a way
that adversely affects the opportunities or status of such applicant or employee because of
the disability of such applicant or employee." 42 U.S.C.A. 12,112(b)(1) (West Pamph. 1992).
'7 For the legislative history of ADA, see S. REP. No. 116, supra note 14, at 28; see
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The ADA's individualized assessments of applicants and em-
ployees has created a very difficult burden for law enforcement em-
ployers in the absence of physical and mental fitness standards
that are job-related and allow for a meaningful individualized as-
sessment, yet would withstand a collateral attack based on dispa-
rate treatment due to race, sex, etc. With no legal consensus on
what police tasks are, a job task analysis defining physical and
mental fitness standards that are job-related for the law enforce-
ment community remains unobtainable. In the long run, once ade-
quate standards are developed, individualized assessment will be-
come a realistic possibility in the hiring and retaining of older
employees (as well as disabled employees under the ADA), and the
need for a law enforcement exemption from the ADEA will dimin-
ish. Meanwhile, in the short run, with the individualized assess-
ment process already being implemented under the ADA pursuant
to law, faulty as it may be in the absence of validated, job-related
physical and mental fitness standards, the prospects for a law en-
forcement BFOQ or a continued law enforcement exemption under
the ADEA become bleaker. The argument is clear: if the law en-
forcemenit community can obey the ADA mandate for individual-
ized assessment and develop physical and mental fitness standards
for that purpose, or at least the perception or appearance of such
standards, then there is no reason not to extend that mandate
under the ADEA to older Americans who wish to work in the law
enforcement field.
VII. THE PUBLIC DEBATE OVER A LAW ENFORCEMENT EXEMPTION
AND ITS PROSPECTS FOR EXTENSION
In 1986 there was a vigorous public debate over whether pub-
lic safety would be endangered by hiring or maintaining older po-
lice officers pursuant to the mandates of the ADEA.180 The debate
proved inconclusive but resulted in a legislated law enforcement
exemption to run for seven years from January 1, 1987 through
December 31, 1993. During this period the law enforcement com-
munity generally maintained its opposition to abolishing age-based
also, Interpretive Appendix, § 1630.9, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,747-49 (1991); H.R. REP. No. 485,
supra note 14, pt. 2 at 45, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 468.
180 See generally Working Americans: Equality At Any Age, 1986: Hearings Before the
Special Senate Committee On Aging, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 92-96 (1986); MTHS AND REALI-
TIES, supra note 19, at 2-9.
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restrictions on hiring and retention but failed to develop any new
data to support either a BFOQ or a permanent law enforcement
exemption. 81 Meanwhile, the EEOC put forth and commissioned a
study contending that age is not an accurate predictor of suitabil-
ity for public safety jobs and that better alternatives were available
to measure such suitability.18 2 In late 1992 some local police de-
partments initiated an effort to mobilize support in favor of a re-
newed legislative extension of the law enforcement exemption.8 3
In the original 1986 public debate, police departments lobbied
Congress with position papers that relied largely on non-empirical,
anecdotal data to support the law enforcement exemption.8 4 Gen-
erally the law enforcement position was a stereotypical feeling that
older police officers will experience more physical and medical
problems, more injuries, and more lost time to the police depart-
ment and, consequently, will be less able than younger police of-
ficers to protect the public. It was precisely such anecdotal testi-
mony that the Supreme Court and most federal courts found
inadequate in striking down the BFOQ defenses to the ADEA of
state and local governments. While all involved in the public de-
bate generally acknowledged that the time involving strong physi-
cal effort in police work is small, proponents of the law enforce-
ment exemption emphasized that when such physical effort is
needed the difference between a younger and an older police officer
can be the difference between life and death to the officer, a fellow
officer, or a citizen.8 5
Proponents of the law enforcement exemption'86 also pointed
"I See, e.g., Epps, supra note 12, at 16 (criticising plan to eliminate mandatory retire-
ment policies).
162 CENTER FOR APPLIED BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES, supra note 12; see also supra note 12
and accompanying text (discussing study).
' See Epps, supra note 12, at 16. The New York City Police Department in consulta-
tion with smaller police departments in New York State and the International Association
of Chiefs of Police was at the forefront of this effort.
'184 See, e.g., Colonel Clinton L. Pagano, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 and its Impact on the Hiring and Retiring Procedures of the New Jersey State Police
and Other Law Enforcement Officers and Firefighters, 99th Cong. 2d Sess., 142-62 (1986)
(Col. Pagano is Superintendent of N.J. State Police).
'1815 See id. at 156.
'16 Supporters included, among others, the International Association of Chiefs of Po-
lice, the National Trooper Coalition, the International Association of Firefighters, the Na-
tional Sheriffs Association, the International Brotherhood of Police Officers, National Gov-
ernors Association, National Association of Attorneys General, National League of Cities,
National Association of Counties, National Public Employer Association, and Labor Rela-
tions Association. See Retirement Policies for Public Safety Officials, 1986 Hearing Before
19931
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to studies indicating a steady decline in police officers' physical ac-
tivities as they get older and noted that those police officers who
are no longer able to perform, regardless of age, are involuntarily
retired with a pension. For example, a New York City Police De-
partment study indicated that the percentage of retirements due to
disability increases steadily and dramatically from 34.9% in the
44-48 year old age group to 73.0% in the 59-63 age group.17 More-
over, proponents argued for parity with the federal mandatory re-
tirement program 8" and warned of the extra costs and limits on
employment and advancement for younger workers that older
workers would create, even though the Supreme Court in Wyo-
ming, and other federal courts, had long made clear that such ar-
guments were unacceptable when made in support of a BFOQ.
Perhaps the strongest argument made by proponents of the
law enforcement exemption was that just as there were no tests or
studies that would satisfactorily establish a BFOQ to rebut an
ADEA complaint, there were no tests or studies available that
would efficiently and effectively measure individual fitness for a
police job or even put forth a consensus as to (a) what constitutes
fitness and whether adaptations have to be made for age, sex, and
disability and (b) what is the police job and how are its tasks to be
evaluated in terms of frequency, criticality, or some other mea-
sure. 189 Complicating the fitness question today is the required im-
plementation of the ADA under which the measure of fitness is
ability to do the job, with or without "reasonable accommoda-
tion," 90 and not the appearance of physical and mental fitness or
medical and psychological diagnoses.
The absence of definitive tests and studies for police depart-
ments to use to establish job tasks and measure fitness to perform
those tasks was of no avail when these departments argued for a
the Subcommittee on Labor at the Senate Commn. on Labor and Human Resources, 99th
Cong. 2d Sess., 54-89, 94-142, 197 (1986) [hereinafter Policies].
187 Clarence Robinson, The Case For Maintaining the N.Y.C.P.D.'s Present Mandatory
Age of Retirement at Age Sixty-Three Years (1986) (Clarence Robinson was Supervising
Chief Surgeon of New York City Police Department) (on file with author).
"' See Hearing on the Exemption From the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
for State and Local Law Enforcement and Firefighting Personnel Before the Subcommit-
tee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Human Resources, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 5-6
(1986) (statement of Senator Wendell H. Ford).
8 ' See id. at 6; Robinson, supra note 187, at 4-5.




BFOQ in the federal courts. The ADEA, the Tamiami two-prong
standard, and the EEOC regulations clearly put the burden of
proof on the police departments in all litigation. In 1986, however,
at the congressional level, police departments were more success-
ful, at least to the extent of obtaining the seven-year law enforce-
ment exemption in order to allow time to determine the best
means of testing police ability to do the job. As it turns out, the
EEOC will fail to put forth a definitive test for hiring or maintain-
ing police officers that satisfies the mandate of the 1986 amend-
ments when the seven-year exemption expires in 1993. The
EEOC's failure was in its reliance on a compilation of data that
largely discredited the age standard while not providing perform-
ance fitness standards that would definitively withstand legal at-
tack as not job-related. The EEOC's failure, while of no help to
police departments in seeking a BFOQ, is perhaps the best argu-
ment in 1993 for an extension of the law enforcement exemption
beyond its expiration in 1993.
During the debate over the 1986 amendments, the opponents
of the law enforcement exemption from the ADEA argued that age
was simply too arbitrary a standard to justify hiring or retirement
policies and that any exemption for law enforcement agencies
would simply permit them to discriminate against older workers
able and willing to do the job.19 ' They noted that age affects each
individual differently, and that there were tests available to mea-
sure the effects of age on individuals, including those that measure
general fitness, cardiovascular condition, and reaction time.192
They cited research on the performance of older law enforcement
officers and firefighters indicating that job performance does not
invariably decline with age.19 3 They also cited research that indi-
cated that there were accurate and economical ways to test physi-
cal fitness and predict levels of performance for law enforcement
occupations. 94 Overall, they saw no problem in the ADEA require-
"' Opponents included the American Association of Retired Persons, the EEOC, and
the National Institute of Aging of the National Institutes of Health. See Policies, supra note
186, at 33-46, 164-69.
192 See generally Retirement Policies for Firefighters, Law Enforcement Officers and
Other Employees Whose Job Performance Affects the Public Health and Safety: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess., 35-46 (1986) (statement of Clarence Thomas, Chairman, EEOC) (advocating that age
should not be sole determining factor) [hereinafter Retirement Policies].
'92 See id. at 38-40.
194 See id. at 38-39 (citing research of Los Angeles Fire Department's physical fitness
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ment for individualized assessments to test for ability and fitness
to perform police and fire work. 195
One study cited by opponents was performed by Professors
Silver and Flynn' 96 and observed that age does not determine who
can safely and effectively perform the duties of a law enforcement
officer or firefighter and that the absence of hiring age limits for
law enforcement officers had no bearing on the future success of
applicants. 97 Professors Silver and Flynn noted that most law en-
forcement work is not generally arduous or hazardous but rather
consists of performing services with only an occasional dangerous
event. Additionally, they found that, rather than physical strength,
presence of mind, maturity, good judgment, and even self-esteem
were important factors in predicting a successful police career.'98
They concluded that the stereotypes about hiring or maintaining
older persons with respect to their physical decline were false. To
support this assertion, they explained that older police officers
have a lower rate of civilian complaints, absenteeism, and turnover;
cities with no maximum hiring limit do not have higher crime
rates; and prior work experience, especially military experience
possessed by many older officers, is a good indicator of a successful
police career.199
The Silver-Flynn study also took issue with the argument by
proponents of the law enforcement exemption that the age limita-
tion is necessary to maintain fit police officers. They noted "that
police personnel frequently are overweight, have ulcers, bad backs
and cardiac problems" and that "these physical problems do not
stem from constant fear of danger or from strenuous activity, but
rather from the basically sedentary nature of the work and the
stress involved in the internal workings of the criminal justice sys-
testing and training programs).
"I See id. at 44-45. They found that any increased costs resulting from physical fitness
testing and training programs are outweighed by collateral benefits. Id.
196 See Sadore Silver & Edith Flynn, Police Selection-Maximum Age Standards: A
Review (1980) (unpublished study conducted for EEOC) (on file with author).
19 Id. at 41.
198 Id. at 38-40; see also Aaron v. Davis, 414 F. Supp. 453, 459 (E.D. Ark. 1976) (older
officers possess superior judgment, skill and knowledge commensurate with life experience).
199 Silver & Flynn, supra note 196, at 40-42; see also Memorandum from Constance L.
Dupree, Associate General Council, EEOC to Leroy D. Clark, General Council, EEOC, at A9
(Aug. 14, 1980) (on file with author) (citing Silver & Flynn, supra note 196) [hereinafter
EEOC Memo]. The Silver-Flynn study rebutted presumptions that.older persons "are previ-




tem."20 0 Another conclusion of the study was "that the arguments
used to justify age restrictions do not relate to the physical re-
quirements of the occupation but rather to bureaucratic concerns
about the type of recruit [coming into the department] (i.e., that
young and malleable recruits are desirable) and various pension
considerations." 20 1
Another study of the suburban Minneapolis police depart-
ments similarly concluded "that the skills of observation, analysis
of information, decision-making, and oral and written communica-
tion were critical to successful law enforcement work" with only a
slight demand for physical activity.0 2
Two other studies cited by the EEOC yielded similar results.
One found that while there was a correlation between advancing
age and declining performance, the decline was more accurately at-
tributable to such factors as increased weight and tobacco con-
sumption rather than to age. In any event, individualized testing
was found to be a far more accurate and efficient means of weeding
out the unfit than an age standard.20 3 The other study found that
age was a poor predictor of acceptable police performance and that
there was often a positive correlation between the older police ap-
plicant and positive performance. 0 4
When the law enforcement exemption to the ADEA was en-
acted in 1986, a number of senators testified that the seven-year
exemption for police and fire departments did not reflect their
feelings in favor of the exemption on the merits but rather their
desire that these departments should be permitted a "grace pe-
riod" in which to adjust to the likely application of the ADEA in
the future.205 The whole thrust of the 1986 amendments to the
201 Silver & Flynn, supra note 196, cited in EEOC Memorandum, supra note 199, at
A10-11.
201 Id.
202 Retirement Policies, supra note 192, at 41.
203 EEOC Memorandum, supra note 199, at A10-11.
204 See EEOC Memorandum, supra note 199, at A12.
20 See, e.g., 132 CONG. REc. H11,283 (1986). Congressman Jeffords stated, "My feelings
are very strong that through the utilization of BFOQ's we do not need to have exemptions,
we need only transition periods. We have provided the necessary transition periods for the
respective groups that are included in this amendment." Id. Congressman Hawkins also tes-
tified, "We have provided 7-year transition periods to allow tenured faculty and police and
firefighters time to adjust to the requirements of this new law .... We are confident that
these university and law enforcement institutions will ultimately benefit from the require-
ment that they begin basing hiring and retirement decisions on an individual's qualifications
and job performance." Id. at 411,281. But see H.R. REP. No. 756, supra note 8, at 16-17
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ADEA was in favor of ending mandatory retirement for all employ-
ment with only a grudging grant of the seven-year exemption.
Following passage of the ADEA amendments of 1986, the
EEOC commissioned, pursuant to the legislation, a study to deter-
mine whether physical and mental fitness tests are valid measure-
ments of the ability and competency of police officers and firefight-
ers to perform the requirements of their jobs.206 The study was
completed in 1992 by an advisory team from Penn State Univer-
sity's Center for Applied Behavioral Sciences. Frank Landy, who
chaired the team, found that chronological age was not a good pre-
dictor of abilities or performance for police, firefighters, or correc-
tion officers. The study, conducted over a sixteen-month period,
concluded that there was no scientific basis to support mandatory
retirement for such public safety personnel and urged Congress to
eliminate the exemption that these occupations had under the
ADEA.2 °7
The Penn State study focused particularly on concerns that
age correlated with sudden physical incapacitation or accumulated
deficits in abilities and found only a marginal correlation with
chronological age. It was noted that the risk of an officer experienc-
ing a catastrophic medical event that would compromise public
safety was so small-about one such event every twenty-five
years-as to eliminate this factor in the debate regarding age-
based retirement. The study's review of public safety duties also
found that the responsibilities of public safety officers only occa-
sionally involved a direct threat to the well-being of citizens or fel-
low officers. Moreover, the study determined that many of the
changes associated with aging were more accurately the results of
illness, injury, and lifestyle variables rather than aging per se.20
(individual views of Congresswoman Roukema advocating exemption to ADEA for police
and firefighters).
200 See 29 U.S.C. § 622 (1988).
20" Frank J. Landy, et al., Alternatives to Chronological Age in Determining Standards
of Suitability for Public Safety Jobs Volume I: Technical Report (Jan. 31, 1992) (unpub-
lished manuscript) (on file with author).
201 Id. at 17-18. Chronological age limits do not, by themselves ensure functional com-
petency of police officers. Aging effects and corresponding implications on job performance
are complex. As age increases, it is possible that there is a decline in some abilities, however,
"[an older person may be able to maintain high levels of performance even though aging
has a detrimental influence on some abilities that contribute to performance." Id. at 4. Suc-
cessful physical performance is dependant upon the relationships among the sensory, motor,
and central nervous system. Id. "Factors such as task complexity, experience, practice, and
physical fitness ... affect ... performance decline." Id. at 4-5. Age limitations do not ad-
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This study in many respects echoed the themes raised in the ear-
lier studies commissioned by the EEOC and used in the 1986 pub-
lic debate on the law enforcement exemption. 0 9
The positions taken on the Penn State study were similar to
those taken in 1986, but with some break in the ranks of the public
safety community. 210 As in 1986, the International Association of
Chiefs of Police, the International Association of Firefighters, the
National League of Cities, and the Fraternal Order of Police,
among others, opposed the recommendation to end the law en-
forcement exemption. 211 However, the American Association of Re-
tired Persons, a perennial opponent of the exemption, was joined
in 1992 in support of the study's recommendation by two small law
enforcement groups, the American Correctional Association and
the National Sheriffs Association, many of whose members op-
posed mandatory retirement.212
The critics of the Penn State study focused on the fact that it
was not independent research but rather a survey and compilation
of the existing literature which was essentially critical of age-based
standards. In addition, the study concentrated on larger police de-
partments serving populations of 50,000 to 100,000 and above
where there was substantial police back-up capability. Yet over
eighty percent of police departments in the country were located in
areas with less than 50,000 people where there would be little or no
police back-up for a police officer who could not fully perform.
Critics also argued that the enormous changes necessitated by the
application of the ADEA to state and local police departments re-
quired an extension of the law enforcement exemption until a bet-
ter assessment could be made of how best to make the transition
to a new policy while protecting public safety.21 3
In view of the fact that a seven-year exemption had been given
dress individual variability, and they do not accurately predict individual performance de-
clines associated with advancing age. Id.
20 See supra notes 196-204 and accompanying text (discussing prior EEOC reports).
210 See 138 CONG. REC. S6,485-85 (daily ed. May 12, 1992).
211 Id. Police and firefighter organizations argued that the conclusion to end the law
enforcement exemption was unrealistic. These groups supported the ADEA and efforts to
ban discrimination, however, they argued that a mandatory retirement age is critically
linked to competent job performance in positions involving public safety. Id.
212 Id. at S6,486. The Executive Director of the American Association of Retired Per-
sons (AARP), Horace B. Dects, maintained that "[r]etirement policies based on chronologi-
cal age do not take into account individual differences and are discriminatory on their face."
Id.
212 See Epps, supra note 12, at 16.
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previously, it is unlikely that Congress will provide another exten-
sion unless somehow it could be convinced that the EEOC had
failed to fulfill its mandate under the 1986 amendments. This ap-
pears unlikely, since the Penn State study supported the EEOC's
earlier determination that the law enforcement exemption should
be terminated. In any event, Congress need not act to amend the
ADEA to eliminate the exemption since the exemption automati-
cally terminates under its sunset provision on December 31, 1993.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
As Chief Justice Burger noted in his dissent in Wyoming, the
interpretation of the ADEA by the EEOC has been so restrictive
that the BFOQ exception based on age has effectively ceased to
exist. '14 In fact the EEOC has never accepted a BFOQ exception
for law enforcement. However, it was not only the EEOC but also
the Supreme Court, and the overwhelming body of federal case
law, that supported the EEOC analysis. Clearly, it is futile for the
law enforcement community to pursue the BFOQ possibility based
on the currently available medical evidence on aging and fitness
testing procedures. They have no convincing, empirically-based
data supporting age restrictions in hiring and retirement policies,
and the age standard remains an arbitrary one. Even if it could be
shown that age limitations further the goal of a fit public safety
department, state and local governments have an obligation to use
the least discriminatory means available to further that goal.21 5
This limitation is similar to the standard a law enforcement em-
ployer would have to meet under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 if it had a policy or practice that had an adverse impact on
women or minorities. Thus, in reality, law enforcement agencies
could not show that the age limitations were "reasonably neces-
sary" rather than merely "reasonable" and so would still have to
find an alternate means of creating a fit public safety department.
Yet, the critics of the age standard, while ably and amply
demonstrating its arbitrariness, have not set forth a definitive test
or standard that state and local governments can use that would
withstand legal attack. They have set forth a number of available
tests that can accurately measure physical and mental fitness
through individualized testing; however, they have presented no
21 See 460 U.S. 226, 257-58 (1983).
2 29 C.F.R. § 1625.6 (1992).
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available physical or mental fitness test that, if challenged in the
courts as not job-related, could be upheld, 16 for mental and physi-
cal fitness do not necessarily mean fitness to do the police job.
There is not even a legal consensus as to what constitute the pre-
cise tasks that a police officer must perform. Without such a job
task analysis it is impossible to measure fitness to do the job as
opposed to mere physical or mental fitness in the abstract. With-
out such a job task analysis a standard based on mere physical or
mental fitness is every bit as arbitrary as an age standard. Even if
or when a job task analysis is completed, the tasks would have to
be evaluated in terms of criticality and frequency, or some other
measure, before fitness to perform these tasks could be measured.
Since it is estimated that a job task analysis for police officers is
217still years away, an individualized assessment of a police officer's
physical or mental fitness as of now serves the law enforcement
community and the public no better than the age standard.
There are other problems with an individualized assessment of
physical and mental fitness without a legal consensus on job tasks.
Mere physical or mental fitness as a standard without a job task
analysis would be violative of the ADA which prevents discrimina-
tion against those with physical or mental disability unless it can
be shown that they cannot perform. A physical fitness test without
a job task analysis might also have a disparate or adverse impact
on the employment of female police officers and thus be violative
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. A fitness test can be
"normed," of course, for sex differentiation so that the paradigm of
fitness for males and females will be different. However, the prob-
lem with "norming" fitness standards by sex is that it takes the
standard for policing even further away from the tasks to be per-
formed in favor of some type of sex parity in hiring. Even if
"norming" fitness standards for sex differences could be defended
to withstand a Title VII attack, it would still not withstand an at-
tack under the ADA as discriminatory due to the absence of vali-
dated job tasks.
In the long run there is no escaping the need to complete a job
216 This conclusion was reached from reviewing the study commissioned by the EEOC
pursuant to the 1986 ADEA Amendments, which presented no physical or mental fitness
test with the assurance that it would withstand a court challenge as job-related. Moreover,
interviews with responsible officials of the New York City Police Department reveal that
development of such tests are years away from completion. See supra note 16.
217 Id.; see also supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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task analysis so that those fit to do the job can be hired and re-
tained. Such is the only hiring and retirement standard that can be
ultimately successful in the face of the ADA and Title VII chal-
lenges. The age standard is ultimately doomed to extinction, even
in the unlikely event that the law enforcement community obtains
another extension of the law enforcement exemption to the ADEA
by emphasizing the EEOC's failure to propose testing guidelines.
In the short run, police agencies will face prohibitive costs in
testing all police candidates and all police incumbents, not just of-
ficers approaching retirement age, for physical, mental, and physi-
ological fitness. For in the absence of another law enforcement ex-
emption at the end of 1993, there will no longer be such a thing as
a "retirement age" for police officers. The ADA's existing individu-
alized assessment standard will be buttressed by the ADEA. These
costs in money and manpower will be in addition to the costs of
developing and completing a job task analysis. As indicated, the
cost outlay will not yield the intended results until the job task
analysis is completed since the fitness measured will not be a true
indicator of fitness for duty.
There will also be increased litigation costs as each individual-
ized assessment that results in a determination that someone is un-
fit will potentially result in litigation. Moreover, settlement costs
will be high because each plaintiff will learn quickly that his litiga-
tion will be successful since it cannot be proven that the "unfit"
litigant cannot do the job. The litigant has only to show the court
that his job tasks have not been validated and that, therefore,
there is no legal consensus on what constitutes "the job."
Since in this time of budgetary constraints the massive public
expenditure required for individualized assessments is not likely to
be fully authorized in any event, the likelihood is for the age stan-
dard to be replaced by a largely standardless hiring and retirement
policy under which the only individuals deemed unfit will be that
small number for whom irrefutable evidence was already available
that they were a danger to themselves or members of the public
rather than to the criminal.
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